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Digest:  Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings Corp. 
Molly S. Machacek 
Opinion by Chin, J., with George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, 
Werdegar, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ. 
Issue 
Does the transmission of e-mail advertisements from 
multiple domain names, with the intent of bypassing a spam 
filter, violate a state statute regulating falsified header 
information in commercial e-mail advertisements? 
Facts 
Craig E. Kleffman had received eleven unsolicited email 
advertisements from eleven different domain names that all 
advertised Vonage and its broadband telephone service.1  While 
none of the domain names specified Vonage as its sender, instead 
using such domain names as “superhugeterm.com; 
formycompanysite.com; ursunrchcntr.com; urgrtquirkz.com; 
countryfolkgospel.com; lowdirectsme.com; yearnfrmore.com; 
openwrldkidz.com; ourgossipfrom.com; specialdlvrguide.com; and 
struggletailssite.com,” each of them can be traced back to the 
same physical address.2 
Subsequently, Kleffman filed a class action lawsuit against 
Vonage Holdings Corporation.3  He asserted a claim under 
section 17529.5(a)(2) of the Business and Professions Code, which 
“makes it unlawful to advertise in a commercial e-mail 
advertisement that ‘contains or is accompanied by falsified, 
misrepresented, or forged header information.’”4 
A traditional Internet service provider (ISP) uses domain 
names to identify a sender, and then can use the spam filter to 
block high volumes of advertisements from a particular sender 
before it reaches the inbox of an ISP client.5  Additionally, a 
client can label a certain sender as spam, which will serve to 
 
 1 Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 232 P.3d 625, 627 (Cal. 2010). 
 2 Id. at 627. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5(a)(2) (West 2010)). 
 5 Id. 
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block future e-mails from that sender or company.6  Kleffman 
asserted in his lawsuit that if Vonage had sent their 
advertisements from the same single e-mail address, then it 
would have been less expensive and time consuming than using 
multiple domain names.7  He further contended that Vonage’s 
only reason for e-mailing from multiple addresses was to 
intentionally bypass the spam filters of ISPs and that it was a 
deliberate strategy to trick the email provider and the client.8  
Kleffman alleged that “[t]he multitude of ‘from’ identities falsifies 
and misrepresents the true sender’s identity and allows 
unwanted commercial email messages to infiltrate consumers’ 
inboxes,” and therefore that it would “constitute falsified and 
misrepresented header information prohibited by section 
17529.5(a)(2).”9 
Vonage removed the case to federal court, and the district 
court granted their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under the code section 17529.5(a)(2), without leave to amend.10  
The district court held that Kleffman did not claim that the 
content of the e-mails from Vonage was false or forged, and while 
the headers did not specify that the sender was Vonage, they 
were truthful in their identification of the sender.11  The plain 
language of the statute requires falsified headers, and it does not 
prohibit failing to send e-mails from a single domain name.12  
The court also found that if such conduct were prohibited by the 
statute, then it would be preempted by the federal “CAN-SPAM 
Act,” so it is not for the court to decide.13  Kleffman appealed, and 
under California Rules of Court rule 8.548,14 the Ninth Circuit 
asked the California Supreme Court to decide the question: “Does 
sending unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisements from 
multiple domain names for the purposes of bypassing spam 
filters constitute falsified, misrepresented, or forged header 
information under [section] 17529.5(a)(2)?”15 
Analysis 
The court found that the central issue was the scope of 
section 17529.5(a)(2), and what is unlawful regarding “falsified, 
 
 6 Id. at 627–28. 
 7 Id. at 628. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 628 n.3.  See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713 (2006). 
 14 Kleffman, 232 P.3d at 628 n.4. 
 15 Id. at 628. 
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misrepresented, or forged header information.”16  The court 
reasoned that the essential goal in statutory interpretation is to 
establish the legislative intent in order to determine the purpose 
of the law, especially in terms of language choice.17  The court 
noted that the parties agreed on certain subjects, such as the fact 
that domain names are considered part of e-mail header 
information for the purposes of the statute.18  The court also 
found no dispute that the e-mails were from Vonage or that the 
domain names used were accurate and fully traceable back to 
that company.19  There was no dispute that the question in this 
case was whether or not the e-mails in question contained 
falsified or misrepresented header information under the 
statute.20 
The court found that the dispute centered on the language of 
the statute and the meaning of the word “misrepresented” as it 
applies to header information.21  Vonage contended that the 
header information would need to be “a false representation of 
fact” in order to be misrepresented.22  The court looked to 
Cooley v. Superior Court, which articulates the rule of statutory 
construction that courts should give meaning to every word in 
the statute, if possible, and should avoid surplusage.23  The court 
applied this reasoning to the instant case in order to determine if 
falsified and misrepresented had different meanings under the 
statute, and found that the legislature must have meant the 
words to have separate meanings.24  Kleffman asserted that 
header information, defined as “source, destination and routing 
information,” is unlawful under the federal CAN-SPAM Act if it 
is materially false or misleading, and that the same definition 
should be applied in this case.25  However, this definition was not 
adopted during the legislative process behind adopting section 
17529.5(a)(2).26  The court rejected Kleffman’s assertion that 
“misrepresented” should be given the meaning that was used in 
Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500, which 
prohibit advertising that is “likely to mislead or deceive, or is in 
fact false,”27 or the meaning from a “lay” dictionary that defines 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. (citing People v. Cole, 135 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 2006)). 
 18 Id. at 628–29. 
 19 Id. at 629. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. (citing Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d 654 (Cal. 2002)). 
 24 Id. at 629. 
 25 Id. at 629 n.5 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7704(a)(1), 7702(8) (2010)). 
 26 Id. at 629 n.5. 
 27 Id. at 629–30 (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500, 17200 (West 2010)). 
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misrepresent as “[t]he act of giving a false or misleading 
statement about something.”28 The court found that 
“misrepresented” and “misleading” had been given different 
meanings by the legislature, and that if the legislature had 
intended to use “misleading,” then they would have done so.29  In 
fact, the court found that the legislature already used “likely to 
mislead” separately in the next provision of the same statute, 
showing that the legislature used the terms differently.30 
The court found that the legislative history for the statute 
was relevant to the issue, but that it did not support Kleffman’s 
position.31  The legislative history, as interpreted by the court, 
“reflects a careful and purposeful distinction between the terms 
‘misrepresented’ and ‘misleading.’”32  An amendment made to the 
bill contained revised language that recognized the linguistic 
difference between section 17529.5 subsections (2) and (3).33  The 
court held that they “must avoid interpretations that would 
render related provisions unnecessary or redundant.”34  
Furthermore, Kleffman based his interpretation of the legislative 
history on a letter written by the legislative author of the bill and 
its amendment, which showed intent to prohibit multiple e-mail 
addresses to avoid a spam filter.35  The court rejected this 
argument because the letter was not part of the Legislative 
discussion leading up to the creation of the statute.36 
The court further found that if the legislative history is read 
to prohibit a domain name that did not clearly state the true 
identity of the sender, it would raise significant problems for 
federal preemption by the CAN-SPAM Act.37  If a state law 
attempted to require further restrictions or labels on e-mail 
headers, it would undoubtedly be preempted by federal statute.38 
The court found that a single e-mail with an “accurate and 
traceable domain name” does not have misrepresented or 
falsified header information within the meaning of the statute 
simply because the domain name is “random,” “varied,” 
“garbled,” and “nonsensical,” as argued by Kleffman.39  Adopting 
 
 28 Id. at 629 n.6. 
 29 Id. at 630. 
 30 Id. (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5(a)(3)). 
 31 Id. at 631. 
 32 Id. at 632. 
 33 Id. (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5(a)(2), (a)(3)). 
 34 Id. at 632. 
 35 Id. at 634. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 632–33 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (2006)). 
 38 Id. at 633. 
 39 Id. 
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a practice that prohibits multiple and random domain names, 
from the same original company, would be overly difficult and 
impractical.40  Additionally, violating section 17529.5(a)(2) is a 
misdemeanor that allows for up to six months in prison, so the 
court was reluctant to add uncertainty to the language of the 
statute.41 
Finally, the court noted that in passing section 17529.5(a)(2), 
the legislature remarked on spam filters and their potential 
limitations.42  However, it found that such limitations do not 
justify altering the meaning of “misrepresented . . . header 
information” in the language of the statute.43 
Holding 
The court answered the question of law under California 
Rules of Court rule 8.548.44  It held that, generally, commercial e-
mail advertisements sent from multiple domain names with the 
intent to bypass spam filters were not made unlawful by section 
17529.5(a)(2).45  The court held that the emails in question did 
not contain or include any misrepresented header information.46  
Therefore, since the statute only governs falsified, 
misrepresented, or forged header information, the statute in 
question did not regulate the electronic advertisements, and the 
e-mails sent by Vonage were not unlawful.47 
Legal Significance 
The court’s decision prevents a flood of potential litigation 
from other members of the public who are annoyed, unhappy, or 
bothered by the amount of commercial e-mail advertisements 
that they receive on a daily basis.  The statute in question only 
governs and punishes those who send falsified or fraudulent 
emails.  While consumers may continue to be bothered by e-mail 
advertisements that their spam filters cannot catch, it is not for 
the court to contort the language that the legislature chose to 
use. 
 
 40 Id. at 634. 
 41 Id. (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5(c) (West 2010)). 
 42 Id. at 635. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 628. 
 45 Id. at 635. 
 46 Id. at 633. 
 47 Id. 
